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Research Article
People with higher levels of the personality trait neu-
roticism—the tendency to experience negative emo-
tions—are more likely to rate their health as poor 
(Goodwin & Engstrom, 2002; Jorm et al., 1993) and to 
report somatic complaints (Costa & McCrae, 1987; 
Neeleman, Bijl, & Ormel, 2004). They are also at 
increased risk of common mental disorders (Kotov, 
Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Lonnqvist et al., 2009; 
Malouff, Thorsteinsson, & Schutte, 2005). Given the 
evidence indicating that people with higher levels of 
psychological distress are more likely to die sooner 
than people with lower levels (Gale et al., 2012; Russ 
et al., 2012), one might expect that higher neuroticism 
would be associated with increased mortality, but find-
ings regarding this prediction are inconsistent.
Whereas some studies have found associations 
between higher neuroticism and increased mortality 
(Shipley, Weiss, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2007; Weiss, Gale, 
Batty, & Deary, 2009), others have found no link 
(Almada et al., 1991; Costa, Weiss, Duberstein, Friedman, 
& Siegler, 2014; Iwasa et al., 2008; Jokela et al., 2013). 
In fact, a few studies have found that neuroticism might 
protect against mortality (Korten et al., 1999; Ploubidis 
& Grundy, 2009; Weiss & Costa, 2005; Weiss, Gale, Batty, 
& Deary, 2013). One explanation for such a protective 
effect might be that some variable moderates the rela-
tionship between neuroticism and mortality. For exam-
ple, there is some evidence that when high neuroticism 
is accompanied by high conscientiousness, it may have 
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Abstract
We examined the association between neuroticism and mortality in a sample of 321,456 people from UK Biobank and 
explored the influence of self-rated health on this relationship. After adjustment for age and sex, a 1-SD increment in 
neuroticism was associated with a 6% increase in all-cause mortality (hazard ratio = 1.06, 95% confidence interval = 
[1.03, 1.09]). After adjustment for other covariates, and, in particular, self-rated health, higher neuroticism was associated 
with an 8% reduction in all-cause mortality (hazard ratio = 0.92, 95% confidence interval = [0.89, 0.95]), as well as with 
reductions in mortality from cancer, cardiovascular disease, and respiratory disease, but not external causes. Further 
analyses revealed that higher neuroticism was associated with lower mortality only in those people with fair or poor 
self-rated health, and that higher scores on a facet of neuroticism related to worry and vulnerability were associated 
with lower mortality. Research into associations between personality facets and mortality may elucidate mechanisms 
underlying neuroticism’s covert protection against death.
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benefits for health, as indicated by lower levels of inflam-
matory biomarkers (Turiano, Mroczek, Moynihan, & 
Chapman, 2013), less smoking after the onset of disease 
(Weston & Jackson, 2015), and lower mortality—albeit 
in women only (Friedman, Kern, & Reynolds, 2010). The 
idea that higher neuroticism might have health advan-
tages in certain circumstances—the concept of “healthy 
neuroticism”—was first put forward by Friedman (2000), 
who suggested that some people who are high in neu-
roticism may be vigilant about their health and seek 
medical advice more readily than other people do.
Another plausible moderator of the neuroticism-
mortality relationship may be self-rated health, which 
predicts mortality independently of objectively measured 
health (Benyamini & Idler, 1999; Ganna & Ingelsson, 
2015; Idler & Benyamini, 1997). People who are higher 
in neuroticism are more likely to rate their health as poor 
(Chapman, Duberstein, & Lyness, 2007; Goodwin & 
Engstrom, 2002). Indications that self-rated health inter-
acts with neuroticism to affect mortality risk come from 
studies in which higher neuroticism was associated with 
lower mortality when effect estimates were adjusted for 
self-rated health (Korten et  al., 1999; Weiss & Costa, 
2005). Korten et al. (1999) reported that this association 
was not apparent in a univariate analysis, but they dis-
cussed the role of neuroticism solely as a confounder of 
the relationship between self-rated health and mortality 
rather than considering why it should become protective 
after adjustment. In addition to possibly moderating the 
association between neuroticism and mortality, self-rated 
health might act as a mediator. Longitudinal evidence 
shows that higher neuroticism is associated with faster 
decline in self-rated health, which might contribute to 
mortality risk (Löckenhoff, Terracciano, Ferrucci, & 
Costa, 2012). A related possibility is highlighted by a 
study by Ploubidis and Grundy (2009), which showed 
that neuroticism had both an indirect and a direct rela-
tionship with mortality risk. Higher neuroticism was 
indirectly related to greater risk via mediators, including 
self-rated health, but, in women only, higher neuroticism 
was also directly related to reduced risk.
We used data from UK Biobank to investigate the 
association between neuroticism and mortality. Our aim 
was to investigate whether and how self-rated health 
influences the relationship between neuroticism and 
risk of death from all causes, cancer, cardiovascular 
disease, respiratory disease, and external causes.
Method
Participants
The participants in this study took part in the baseline 
survey of UK Biobank (Sudlow et al., 2015; see also UK 
Biobank’s Web site: http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk), a 
resource established for identifying determinants of 
disease in middle-aged and older people. Between 2006 
and 2010, 502,655 community-dwelling people who 
were ages 37 to 73 years and living in the United King-
dom were recruited to the study. UK Biobank received 
ethical approval from the North West Multi-Centre 
Research Ethics Committee (Reference 11/NW/0382).
Measures
Neuroticism. Participants completed the 12-item Neu-
roticism scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-
Revised (EPQ-R) Short Form (Eysenck, Eysenck, & 
Barrett, 1985). Response options were “true,” “false,” “do 
not know,” and “prefer not to answer”; the latter two 
responses were coded as missing data. We used the 
summed score for our main analyses. The EPQ-R Short 
Form has been concurrently validated in older people 
using the Emotional Stability scale of the International 
Personality Item Pool (r = −.84) and the Neuroticism 
domain of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (r = .85; Gow, 
Whiteman, Pattie, & Deary, 2005).
Self-rated health. Participants were asked, “In general 
how would you rate your overall health?” Responses 
were coded as “excellent,” “good,” “fair,” or “poor.”
Other covariates. In addition to age, sex, and self-
rated health, we chose to include various health behav-
iors, physical attributes, cognitive function, diagnosed 
disease, and socioeconomic position as covariates on 
the grounds that they might mediate or confound the 
relationships between neuroticism and mortality. All 
the covariates were assessed along with neuroticism 
during the baseline survey. It was therefore not possi-
ble to be certain about the temporal ordering of all of 
the covariates.
Health behaviors included were smoking status (never 
smoked, ex-smoker, current smoker), frequency of alco-
hol intake (never, on special occasions only, one to three 
times a month, once or twice a week, three or four times 
a week, daily, or almost daily), consumption of five or 
more portions of fruit and vegetables per day (yes or 
no), and number of types of physical activity performed 
in the last 4 weeks. The categories of physical activity 
were walking for pleasure, heavy do-it-yourself activities 
(e.g., weeding, lawn mowing, carpentry, digging), light 
do-it-yourself activities (e.g., pruning, watering the 
lawn), strenuous sports, and other exercise.
Physical attributes included body mass index (BMI), 
systolic blood pressure, forced expiratory volume in 1 
s (FEV1), and grip strength, all of which were measured 
during a visit to a UK Biobank Assessment Centre. Body 
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mass index (kilograms/meter2) was calculated from 
height and weight. Systolic blood pressure was measured 
with an automated Omron device (www.omronhealthcare 
.com). FEV1 was measured using a Vitalograph (www 
.vitalograph.com) Pneumotrac 6800. Grip strength of 
each hand was measured using a Jamar J00105 hydrau-
lic hand dynamometer (Lafayette Instrument, Lafayette, 
IN); the maximum value was used in our analyses.
Our measure of cognitive function was reaction 
time. Reaction time and scores on other measures of 
processing speed are moderately highly correlated 
with intelligence; people with higher intelligence tend 
to process information more quickly (Deary, Der, & 
Ford, 2001). Reaction time was measured using a go/
no-go “Snap” game. Via a computer screen, partici-
pants were presented with two cards with symbols 
on them. Participants were instructed that if the cards 
were identical, they should push a button as quickly 
as possible using their dominant hand; otherwise, 
they should not respond. Twelve pairs of cards were 
shown. The first five pairs were used as a practice. 
Of the remaining seven pairs, four contained identical 
cards. The score for reaction time was the mean time 
in milliseconds before a participant pressed the but-
ton when one of these four pairs was presented. Inter-
nal consistency of the four test trials was high 
(Cronbach’s α = .85).
Diagnosed disease was assessed via self-report. Par-
ticipants indicated whether they had been diagnosed 
by a physician with vascular or heart problems, diabe-
tes, cancer, chronic bronchitis or emphysema, asthma, 
deep vein thrombosis, or pulmonary embolism.
Socioeconomic position was assessed using each 
participant’s highest educational qualification and 
Townsend deprivation score (Townsend, Phillimore, & 
Beattie, 1988). The latter score was based on census 
data on unemployment, car and house ownership, and 
overcrowding for the participant’s postcode of 
residence.
Mortality. We used death certificates from the National 
Health Service Central Registry to identify the causes of 
death for those participants who died during the study 
period, which ended June 12, 2015. In addition to examin-
ing mortality from all causes, we looked at cause-specific 
mortality, using the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases, 10th revision (World Health Organisation, 1992), 
to categorize deaths as due to cardiovascular disease 
(codes I20-5, I50, I60-70, I73, I74), cancer (codes C00-C97), 
respiratory disease (codes J00-J99), or external causes 
(codes V01-Y99). Any mention of any of these causes on 
a death certificate was counted as death from that cause. 
The mean follow-up time was 6.25 years.
Statistical analysis
Having checked that the assumption of proportional 
hazards was met, we used Cox proportional-hazards 
regressions to examine all-cause and cause-specific 
mortality per 1-SD increment in neuroticism. Survival 
time in days was calculated from date of attendance at 
the Assessment Centre to date of death or June 12, 2015, 
whichever occurred first. In examining associations 
between neuroticism and all-cause and cause-specific 
mortality, we initially adjusted for age and sex, and then 
further adjusted for health behaviors, physical attri-
butes, reaction time, diagnosed disease, and socioeco-
nomic position; finally, we adjusted for self-rated health. 
We estimated the impact on the hazard ratio (HR) of 
adjusting for individual covariates using the following 
formula described by Batty, Der, Macintyre, and Deary 
(2006):
([HR adjusted for age and sex – 1] –  
[HR adjusted for age, sex, and a third covariate – 1]/ 
[HR adjusted for age and sex – 1]) × 100.  
(1)
We then examined whether relationships between 
neuroticism and all-cause and cause-specific mortality 
were moderated by levels of self-rated health by includ-
ing interaction terms in age- and sex-adjusted models 
and testing whether the interactions were statistically 
significant. We also examined the relationships between 
neuroticism and all-cause and cause-specific mortality 
at each level of self-rated health with adjustments for 
the other covariates.
Neuroticism has a hierarchical structure, as do other 
personality factors (Costa & McCrae, 1995); items define 
lower-order facets, which, in turn, define the factor. 
Therefore, we examined whether any neuroticism facet 
or facets uniquely predicted mortality risk, or whether 
the association between neuroticism and mortality risk 
was attributable to the common variance. To do so, we 
first ran an exploratory structural equation model with 
an oblique bifactor Geomin rotation ( Jennrich & 
Bentler, 2011, 2012) in Mplus Version 7.4 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 1998–2015) to extract a general Neuroticism 
factor and two facets that were orthogonal to the gen-
eral factor but correlated with each other. Next, we 
entered the general Neuroticism factor score and the 
facet scores, simultaneously, in further Cox models that 
were like those described earlier.
We carried out multiple tests of statistical signifi-
cance. To reduce the likelihood of false positive results, 
we adjusted the p values for the false discovery rate 
(FDR; Benjamini, Drai, Elmer, Kafkafi, & Golani, 2001). 
We report results with and without this correction. In 
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view of the very large sample size, only p values below 
.001 were considered statistically significant.
Our analytical sample included 321,456 participants 
(64% of the 502,655 people recruited to UK Biobank) 
who had complete data on neuroticism, self-rated 
health, and the other covariates at baseline and on 
mortality during the follow-up.
Results
Table 1 shows the baseline characteristics of the study 
participants, separately for those who did and did not 
die during the follow-up period. In this very large sam-
ple with 4,497 deaths, most of our covariates were 
significantly associated with survival: Death in the 
follow-up period was associated with older age, being 
male, being a current smoker, drinking alcohol daily or 
almost daily, engaging in fewer types of exercise, eating 
fewer than five portions of fruits and vegetables per 
day, higher BMI, higher systolic blood pressure, lower 
FEV1, slower reaction time, having diagnoses of various 
physical diseases, not having a university degree, living 
in an area of greater social deprivation, and poorer 
self-rated health (ps < .0001).
Neuroticism and mortality
Mean neuroticism scores were lower among partici-
pants who died during the follow-up period than 
among those who survived. This difference arose 
because men tended to score lower in neuroticism and 
have higher mortality: When men and women were 
analyzed separately, there was no difference in mean 
neuroticism between participants who survived and 
participants who died: mean scores were 3.54 (SD = 
3.17) and 3.54 (SD = 3.15), respectively, for men (p = 
.987) and 4.50 (SD = 3.23) and 4.43 (SD = 3.28) for 
women (p = .330).
People who were higher in neuroticism rated their 
health as poorer; the rank-order correlation between 
neuroticism and self-rated health (based on four catego-
ries) was significant, rS = .23, p < .0001. Neuroticism 
scores tended to be lower with increasing age, r = −.10, 
p < .0001.
Table 2 shows HRs and 95% confidence intervals 
(CIs) for all-cause and cause-specific mortality per 1-SD 
increment in neuroticism. In the age- and sex-adjusted 
analysis, all-cause mortality was higher in study partici-
pants with higher levels of neuroticism, HR = 1.06, 95% 
Table 1. Comparison of the Baseline Characteristics of the Study Participants Who Did and Did Not Survive 
Until the End of the Follow-Up Period (N = 321,456)
Characteristic
Died during follow-up
Group 
comparison: 
p value
Yes 
(n = 4,497)
No
(n = 316,959)
Age (years) M = 61.0 (SD = 6.76) M = 56.1 (SD = 8.06) < .0001
Female n = 1,784 (39.7%) n = 171,943 (54.3%) < .0001
Neuroticism M = 3.89 (SD = 3.23) M = 4.06 (SD = 3.24)   .0005
Fair or poor self-rated health n = 1,829 (40.7%) n = 69,144 (21.8%) < .0001
Current smoker n = 801 (17.8%) n = 30,471 (9.61%) < .0001
< 5 portions of fruits and vegetables per day n = 1,599 (35.6%) n = 123,748 (39.0%) < .0001
Alcohol daily or almost daily n = 1,119 (24.5%) n = 68,188 (21.2%) < .0001
Types of physical activity in the last 4 weeks M = 1.96 (SD = 1.17) M = 2.31 (SD = 1.16) < .0001
BMI (kg/m2) M = 28.0 (SD = 5.24) M = 27.3 (SD = 4.66) < .0001
Systolic blood pressure (mm Hg) M = 139.2 (SD = 19.9) M = 135.3 (SD = 18.4) < .0001
Grip strength (kg) M = 32.7 (SD = 11.0) M = 33.0 (SD = 11.3)  .022
FEV1 (liters) M = 2.62 (SD = 0.84) M = 2.85 (SD = 0.80) < .0001
Reaction time (ms) M = 587.0 (SD = 126.8) M = 553.7 (SD = 113.1) < .0001
Vascular or heart problems n = 1,946 (43.3%) n = 87,348 (27.6%) < .0001
Diabetes n = 507 (11.3%) n = 14,432 (4.55%) < .0001
Asthma n = 441 (9.81%) n = 34,428 (10.9%)  .024
Chronic lung disease n = 175 (3.89%) n = 3,547 (1.12%) < .0001
Cancer n = 1,141 (25.4%) n = 22,655 (7.15%) < .0001
Deep vein thrombosis n = 162 (3.60%) n = 5,644 (1.78%) < .0001
Pulmonary embolism n = 67 (1.49%) n = 2,181 (0.69%) < .0001
University degree n = 1,169 (26.0%) n = 109,818 (34.7%) < .0001
Townsend index Mdn = −1.93 
(IQR = −3.55 to 1.01)
Mdn = −2.29 
(IQR −3.70 to 0.19)
< .0001
Note: BMI = body mass index; FEV1 = forced expiratory volume in 1 s; IQR = interquartile range.
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CI = [1.03, 1.09]. In additional models, we made further 
separate adjustments for the other covariates to gauge 
the impact of each on the association between neuroti-
cism and mortality. Adjustment for health behaviors had 
the strongest attenuating effect on the association, 
reducing it by 100%. Adjustment for physical attributes, 
socioeconomic position, and existing illness each atten-
uated the association by 50%. Adjustment for reaction 
time attenuated the association only by 17%. Following 
adjustment for self-rated health, the association between 
neuroticism and mortality reversed direction, such that 
higher neuroticism was significantly linked with lower 
mortality, HR = 0.93, 95% CI = [0.90, 0.96]. The size of 
this reversed effect was little changed when the model 
simultaneously adjusted for all the covariates: A 1-SD 
increase in neuroticism was associated with an 8% 
reduction in mortality risk, HR = 0.92, 95% CI = [0.89, 
0.95]. After FDR correction, these latter two associations 
remained significant, p < .001.
Cancer was the most common cause of death in the 
study sample. There was no significant association 
between neuroticism and risk of death from cancer in 
the age- and sex-adjusted analysis. Further separate 
adjustment for health behaviors, physical attributes, 
reaction time, socioeconomic position, and existing ill-
ness had little effect on the association between neu-
roticism and cancer mortality, and it remained 
nonsignificant. Following adjustment for self-rated 
health, higher neuroticism became significantly linked 
with lower risk of death from cancer, HR = 0.90, 95% 
CI = [0.87, 0.94]. The size of this effect was unchanged 
by simultaneous adjustment for all covariates: A 1-SD 
increase in neuroticism was associated with a 10% 
reduction in risk, HR = 0.90, 95% CI = [0.86, 0.93]. After 
FDR correction, these latter two associations remained 
significant, p < .001.
People who were higher in neuroticism tended to 
have an increased risk of death from cardiovascular 
disease and respiratory disease in the age- and sex-
adjusted analysis, although neither of these associations 
was statistically significant either before or after FDR 
correction. As with all-cause mortality, we observed a 
reversal of the association between neuroticism and 
mortality specifically after adjustment for self-rated 
health. After this adjustment, neuroticism was associ-
ated with a reduced risk of death from both cardiovas-
cular disease, HR = 0.91, 95% CI = [0.85, 0.98], and 
respiratory disease, HR = 0.90, 95% CI = [0.83, 0.98]. 
Neither of these associations was significant at p < .001.
The effect sizes increased slightly after simultaneous 
adjustment for all the covariates: A 1-SD increment in 
neuroticism was associated with a reduction in risk of 
11% for mortality due to cardiovascular disease, HR = 
0.89, 95% CI = [0.83, 0.95], and with a reduction in risk 
of 13% for mortality due to respiratory disease, HR = 
0.87, 95% CI = [0.80, 0.94]. These latter models (both 
ps = .001) did not meet our criterion for significance 
before FDR correction; after FDR correction, they had 
p values of .008.
The results for death from external causes showed 
a different pattern. Higher neuroticism was associated 
with increased risk of death from external causes in the 
age- and sex-adjusted analysis, and this association was 
significant both before and after FDR correction. Sepa-
rate adjustments for health behaviors, physical attri-
butes, reaction time, socioeconomic position, and 
existing illness each attenuated this association, by 
between 30% (health behaviors) and 5% (reaction time). 
Separate adjustment for self-rated health attenuated the 
association by 65%, and rendered it nonsignificant, p = 
.148. Simultaneous adjustment for all the covariates 
attenuated the relationship still further.
In summary, age- and sex-adjusted analyses showed 
that higher neuroticism was associated with a slight 
increase in all-cause mortality. However, after adjust-
ment for self-rated health, higher neuroticism was asso-
ciated with reduced mortality from all causes and 
cancer (both ps < .001) and with nonsignificant reduc-
tions in mortality from cardiovascular disease and respi-
ratory disease (both ps = .008 after FDR correction). 
Higher neuroticism was associated with increased mor-
tality from external causes, but this association was no 
longer significant after adjustment for self-rated health 
and other covariates.
The neuroticism-mortality association 
by level of self-rated health
We next examined whether the associations between 
neuroticism and mortality from all causes, cancer, car-
diovascular disease, respiratory disease, and external 
causes varied according to level of self-rated health. Tests 
of the interaction between neuroticism and self-rated 
health met our imposed level of significance (p < .001) 
in the case of mortality from cancer (p = .0007), but not 
in the case of mortality from all causes (p = .003), car-
diovascular disease (p = .806), respiratory disease (p = 
.362), or external causes (p = .734). For mortality from 
all causes and mortality from cancer, we compared the 
models that included the interaction with the models 
that did not include it. We found that the model with the 
interaction fitted the data better than the model without 
the interaction only in the case of mortality from cancer. 
The likelihood ratio test statistics (distributed as a chi-
square, df = 3) were 13.81 for all-cause mortality (p = 
.003) and 17.14 for cancer-related mortality (p = .0007). 
Likelihood ratio tests are sensitive to sample size, so 
these results should be viewed with caution.
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Next, we carried out exploratory analyses in which 
we examined the associations between neuroticism and 
mortality, stratifying by self-rated health. Table 3 shows 
the HRs and 95% CIs for death from all causes and 
specific causes per 1-SD increment in neuroticism for 
each level of self-rated health. (Results for mortality 
from all causes, cardiovascular disease, respiratory dis-
ease, and external causes are included in the table to 
provide full results, even though the relationship 
between neuroticism and these causes of death did not 
vary by level of self-rated health.) For all causes of 
death, neuroticism was significantly protective against 
mortality in participants who rated their health as fair 
or poor (p < .001), but not in those who rated their 
health as excellent or good. The age- and sex-adjusted 
HR was 0.89, 95% CI = [0.83, 0.94], for participants who 
rated their health as fair and 0.83, 95% CI = [0.76, 0.90], 
for participants who rated their health as poor. After 
adjustment for all the covariates, the corresponding HRs 
were 0.89, 95% CI = [0.83, 0.94], and 0.86, 95% CI = 
[0.79, 0.94]. Both associations were statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels, but only the association 
among participants with fair self-rated health met our 
more stringent criterion for significance (p < .001) after 
FDR correction. For cancer-related mortality, too, neu-
roticism was significantly protective in participants who 
rated their health as fair or poor. The age- and sex-
adjusted HR for death from cancer per 1-SD increment 
in neuroticism was 0.87, 95% CI = [0.80, 0.94], for those 
who rated their health as fair and 0.73, 95% CI = [0.65, 
0.82], for those who rated their health as poor. Further 
adjustment for all the covariates had little or no attenu-
ating effects on these associations: The multivariable-
adjusted HRs were 0.87, 95% CI = [0.81, 0.94], for 
participants who rated their health as fair and 0.80, 95% 
CI = [0.71, 0.90], for those who rated their health as 
poor, and both associations remained statistically sig-
nificant after FDR correction.
We examined the extent to which higher neuroticism 
might compensate for the adverse influence of poor 
self-rated health on mortality by comparing the main 
effect of poor self-rated health and the effect of its 
interaction with neuroticism. In the case of all-cause 
mortality, after adjustment for all the covariates, poor 
self-rated health was associated with a more than three-
fold increase in risk of death, HR = 3.27, 95% CI = [2.84, 
3.77]; including the interaction of poor self-rated health 
with neuroticism in the model reduced this risk only 
slightly, HR = 2.99, 95% CI = [2.28, 4.04]. In the case of 
cancer-related mortality, poor self-rated health was also 
associated with a more than threefold increase in risk 
of death, HR = 3.26, 95% CI = [2.74, 3.89]; including the 
interaction of poor self-rated health with neuroticism 
in the model reduced the risk a little more than in the 
case of all-cause mortality, but again, the reduction in 
risk was small, HR = 2.77, 95% CI = [2.35, 3.27].
In summary, exploratory analyses suggested that the 
relationships between neuroticism and mortality from all 
causes and cancer, but not those between neuroticism 
and mortality from cardiovascular disease, respiratory 
disease, or external causes, varied by level of self-rated 
health. Higher neuroticism was protective against mortal-
ity from all causes and from cancer only in participants 
who rated their health as fair or poor. After FDR correc-
tion, higher neuroticism remained significantly associ-
ated with reduced risk of death from cancer in participants 
who rated their health as fair or poor, but was associated 
with reduced risk of death from all causes only in those 
who rated their health as fair. Comparison of the main 
effect of poor self-rated health with the effect of its 
interaction with neuroticism on mortality risk suggested 
that higher neuroticism reduced risk of death from all 
causes and from cancer in participants with poor self-
rated health by only a small amount.
Neuroticism facets and mortality
At the suggestion of a referee, we explored the appar-
ent protective association between neuroticism and 
mortality that was revealed after adjustment for self-
rated health. The full exploratory structural equation 
model of the neuroticism items from the EPQ-R Short 
Form is presented in the Supplemental Material avail-
able online. This structure consisted of a general Neu-
roticism factor, onto which all items loaded; two facets 
were orthogonal to the general Neuroticism factor and 
correlated with each other at .312, p < .0001. The gen-
eral Neuroticism factor correlated .96 with score on the 
full neuroticism scale. The three items with the highest 
loadings on the first facet, which we labeled “anxious-
tense,” were “Would you call yourself a nervous per-
son?” (loading = .608), “Do you suffer from ‘nerves’?” 
(loading = .490), and “Would you call yourself tense or 
‘highly strung’?” (loading = .352). The four items with 
the highest loadings on the second facet, which we 
labeled “worried-vulnerable,” were “Do you worry too 
long after an embarrassing experience?” (loading = 
.568), “Are your feelings easily hurt?” (loading = .399), 
“Are you ever troubled by feelings of guilt?” (loading = 
.315), and “Are you a worrier?” (loading = .309). The 
factor determinacies for the general factor and two 
facets were .919, .790, and .721, respectively. For the 
factor scores extracted from this analysis, the anxious-
tense facet and the worried-vulnerable facet correlated 
.26 and .38, respectively, with scores on the full neuroti-
cism scale, both ps < .0001. Scores on these facets cor-
related .07 and .12, respectively, with scores on the 
general factor, and .43 with each other, all ps < .0001.
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Table 4 shows the associations between a 1-SD incre-
ment in each facet and all-cause and cause-specific 
mortality, when the facets were entered simultaneously 
along with the general Neuroticism factor. The anxious-
tense facet was not significantly associated with risk of 
all-cause or cause-specific mortality. Higher scores on 
the worried-vulnerable facet were associated with a sig-
nificantly reduced risk of death from all causes in the 
age- and sex-adjusted analysis, HR = 0.88, 95% CI = 
[0.86, 0.91]. After further adjustment for all the covari-
ates, the effect was attenuated but remained significant, 
even after FDR correction, HR = 0.94, 95% CI = [0.90, 
0.97]. In the age- and sex-adjusted models, higher 
worried-vulnerable scores were also associated with a 
significantly reduced risk of death from cancer, HR = 
0.93, 95% CI = [0.89, 0.97]; cardiovascular disease, HR = 
0.84, 95% CI = [0.78, 0.91]; and respiratory disease, HR = 
0.84, 95% CI = [0.77, 0.91], but not from external causes. 
However, none of these associations remained significant 
after adjustment for all the covariates and correction for 
multiple testing.
The role of health behaviors
To explore whether physical activity, fruit and vegetable 
consumption, smoking, or alcohol use might help 
explain the protective effect of higher neuroticism on 
mortality from all causes and cancer in participants with 
fair or poor self-rated health, we examined whether the 
correlations between neuroticism and these health 
behaviors differed between participants who rated their 
health as fair or poor and those who rated their health 
as excellent or good. Before the data were stratified by 
self-rated health, after adjustments for age and sex, 
higher neuroticism was modestly but significantly cor-
related (p < .0001) with less healthy behaviors: It was 
negatively correlated with eating at least five portions 
of fruits and vegetables daily (r = −.042) and with the 
number of types of physical activity that participants 
engaged in (r = −.100), but positively correlated with 
being a current smoker (r = .050) and drinking alcohol 
daily or nearly daily (r = .015). Comparing the corre-
sponding correlations and their 95% CIs between par-
ticipants who rated their health as excellent or good 
and those who rated their health as fair or poor showed 
that there was no significant difference between these 
groups of participants in any of these behaviors. More-
over, in multivariable models of all-cause and cancer-
related mortality, the effect sizes for neuroticism were 
essentially the same whether or not we included these 
health-behavior covariates. Thus, our results suggest 
that these behaviors do not account for the association 
Table 4. Hazard Ratios (HRs) for All-Cause and Cause-Specific Mortality per 1-SD Increment in the 
Anxious-Tense and Worried-Vulnerable Facets of Neuroticism, Examined Simultaneously (N = 321,456)
Cause of death and adjustments
Anxious-tense facet Worried-vulnerable facet
HR p, pFDR HR p, pFDR
All causes (n = 4,497)  
 Age, sex, and Neuroticism factor 1.00 [0.98, 1.03] .905, .937 0.88 [0.86, 0.91] < .001, < .001
 All covariates 0.99 [0.96, 1.03] .652, .819 0.94 [0.90, 0.97] < .001, < .001
Cancer (n = 2,912)  
 Age, sex, and Neuroticism factor 0.96 [0.92, 1.00] .065, .180 0.93 [0.89, 0.97] < .001, < .001
 All covariates 0.96 [0.92, 1.00] .072, .180 0.97 [0.92, 1.01] .097, .194
Cardiovascular disease (n = 925)  
 Age, sex, and Neuroticism factor 1.00 [0.93, 1.07] .920, .935 0.84 [0.78, 0.91] < .001, < .001
 All covariates 0.99 [0.92, 1.06] .708, .833 0.93 [0.86, 1.00] .045, .150
Respiratory disease (n = 688)  
 Age, sex, and Neuroticism factor 1.02 [0.94, 1.11] .588, .819 0.84 [0.77, 0.91] < .001, < .001
 All covariates 0.98 [0.90, 1.06] .581, .819 0.93 [0.85, 1.01] .081, .180
External causes (n = 422)  
 Age, sex, and Neuroticism factor 1.03 [0.90, 1.13] .655, .819 0.92 [0.82, 1.02] .114, .207
 All covariates 1.00 [0.90, 1.10] .937, .937 0.97 [0.87, 1.08] .631, .819
Note: Effect estimates were first adjusted for age, sex, and the general Neuroticism factor and then further adjusted for 
other covariates at baseline: health behaviors (smoking status, frequency of alcohol intake, number of types of exercise 
engaged in, and daily consumption of fruits and vegetables), physical attributes (body mass index, forced expiratory 
volume in 1 s, systolic blood pressure, and grip strength), reaction time, existing illness (diagnosis of vascular or heart 
problems, diabetes, cancer, asthma, chronic lung disease, deep vein thrombosis, or pulmonary embolism at baseline), 
socioeconomic position (Townsend index score and highest educational qualification), and self-rated health. Values inside 
brackets are 95% confidence intervals. p = uncorrected p value; pFDR = p value corrected for the false discovery rate.
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between higher neuroticism and lower mortality risk in 
people with fair or poor self-rated health.
We explored the relationship between neuroticism 
and health behaviors further by investigating whether 
the presence of disease at baseline (diagnosis of vas-
cular or heart problems, diabetes, cancer, asthma, 
chronic lung disease, deep vein thrombosis, or pulmo-
nary embolism) moderated this relationship. Age- and 
sex-adjusted correlations between neuroticism and the 
health behaviors were very similar in participants with 
and without diagnosed disease, and analyses showed 
that they did not differ significantly between these two 
groups.
The role of diagnosed disease
Participants who had a diagnosed disease at baseline 
were more likely to rate their health as fair or poor, 
compared with those who did not have such a diagno-
sis, and they were also more likely to have died during 
the follow-up period. We examined whether having any 
diagnosis participants were asked about at baseline (i.e., 
vascular or heart problems, diabetes, cancer, asthma, 
chronic lung disease, deep vein thrombosis, or pulmo-
nary embolism) moderated the associations between 
neuroticism and all-cause and cancer-related mortality 
in participants who viewed their health as fair or poor. 
The p values for the interaction terms were not statisti-
cally significant (ps = .749 and .942, respectively).
The effect of missing covariate data
The analyses described thus far were based on 321,456 
participants (64% of the 502,655 people recruited to UK 
Biobank) who had complete data on neuroticism, self-
rated health, and all the other covariates at baseline. 
To explore whether excluding people with missing 
covariate data biased our findings, we carried out a 
sensitivity analysis including the 401,265 people who 
had data on neuroticism and self-rated health. The asso-
ciations were similar to those described in the previous 
sections. For example, the age- and sex-adjusted HR 
for death from all causes per 1-SD increment in neuroti-
cism was 1.10, 95% CI = [1.08, 1.13]; after further adjust-
ment for self-rated health, the HR changed to 0.94, 95% 
CI = [0.91, 0.96]. In our sample of participants with 
complete data on all variables, the corresponding HRs 
were 1.06, 95% CI = [1.03, 1.09], and 0.93, 95% CI = 
[0.90, 0.96], respectively.
Discussion
In this prospective study, age- and sex-adjusted analy-
ses showed that higher neuroticism was associated with 
a slight increase in mortality risk overall. However, after 
adjustment for other covariates, and, in particular, self-
rated health, higher neuroticism was associated with 
reduced mortality from all causes, cancer, cardiovascu-
lar disease, and respiratory disease, but not external 
causes. The relationships between neuroticism and 
mortality from all causes and cancer varied according 
to self-rated health. Tests of the overall interaction 
between neuroticism and self-rated health did not meet 
our imposed criterion for significance (p < .001) in the 
case of mortality from all causes (p = .003) and were 
significant in the case of mortality from cancer (p = 
.0007). Exploratory analyses in which we stratified the 
sample by self-rated health showed that higher neuroti-
cism was associated with reduced mortality from all 
causes and from cancer in participants who rated their 
health as fair or poor; only the association with cancer 
was significant after FDR correction. The compensatory 
effect of higher neuroticism on risk of death from all 
causes or cancer in participants with poor self-rated 
health was small.
We also examined whether two Neuroticism facets—
anxious-tense and worried-vulnerable—that were inde-
pendent of the common Neuroticism variance were 
associated with mortality. Higher scores on the worried-
vulnerable facet were associated with a reduced risk of 
death from all causes. This effect persisted after adjust-
ment for all the covariates and survived correction for 
multiple testing. Higher scores on the worried-
vulnerable facet were also associated with lower mor-
tality from cancer, cardiovascular disease, and 
respiratory disease, but only in the age- and sex-
adjusted models. The anxious-tense facet was not asso-
ciated with mortality.
Although higher neuroticism has been linked with 
poorer subjective health (Goodwin & Engstrom, 2002; 
Watson & Pennebaker, 1989), it might be protective 
against death if it leads individuals to be vigilant in tak-
ing care of their health (Friedman, 2000). We found 
some support for that notion: Among people who rated 
their health as poor or fair, higher neuroticism was asso-
ciated with a reduced mortality from all causes and 
cancer. No such effect was observed in participants with 
excellent self-rated health. We found no indication to 
suggest that diet, exercise, smoking, or drinking 
explained the association between neuroticism and mor-
tality in participants with fair or poor self-rated health, 
but our data were restricted to behavior at the start of 
the study, and so may not reflect changes in these 
behaviors made subsequently. Higher neuroticism was 
associated with poorer health behaviors, although the 
size of all these correlations was small. We found no 
evidence that these correlations differed between par-
ticipants with excellent or good self-rated health and 
participants with fair or poor self-rated health. There 
was also no evidence that these correlations differed 
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between participants who had diagnosed disease at 
baseline and those who did not. If concerns about 
health underlie our finding that higher neuroticism is 
linked with lower mortality from all causes and cancer 
in people with relatively poor self-rated health, concerns 
about health do not appear to be manifested via the 
health behaviors we examined at baseline.
There is evidence that higher neuroticism is associ-
ated with greater use of health-care services (Cuijpers 
et al., 2010). This propensity to seek medical help in 
response to worries about health could plausibly result 
in earlier identification of cancer, and greater likelihood 
of survival. We were unable to investigate whether the 
protective effect of higher neuroticism in people with 
fair or poor self-rated health was due to seeking profes-
sional advice in response to symptoms or compliance 
with medical treatment, but our finding that higher 
neuroticism among these participants was associated 
with a reduction in risk of death from cancer is consis-
tent with that explanation, as is our observation that 
higher scores on the worried-vulnerable facet of the 
Neuroticism factor were associated with reduced mor-
tality from all causes. It is worth noting that higher 
scores on this facet were associated with lower mortal-
ity even when we did not adjust for self-rated health.
Strengths of our study include the number of deaths 
in our large sample and the inclusion of data on a range 
of potential confounding factors. One limitation is that 
no data were available on personality traits other than 
neuroticism. We could not examine whether conscien-
tiousness, for example, moderated neuroticism’s rela-
tionship with mortality. Being high in conscientiousness 
may lead individuals who are high in neuroticism to 
live a particularly healthy lifestyle, possibly in response 
to health concerns (Vollrath & Torgersen, 2002; Weston 
& Jackson, 2015). Weston and Jackson (2015) found 
that after the onset of chronic physical disease, people 
who were high in neuroticism and high in conscien-
tiousness, “healthy neurotics,” smoked less. This com-
bination of neuroticism and conscientiousness was 
negatively associated with smoking only after disease 
onset. Weston and Jackson therefore suggested that 
high conscientiousness may enable individuals high in 
neuroticism to act on their anxiety by making behav-
ioral changes when they are confronted by disease. We 
found no evidence that the relationship between neu-
roticism and health behaviors differed between partici-
pants with and without physical illness at baseline, but 
were unable to examine the potential impact of con-
scientiousness on this relationship.
Another limitation of our study is that our follow-up 
period was relatively short—on average, 6.25 years. We 
cannot gauge whether the association between higher 
neuroticism and reduced mortality in people with poor 
self-rated health persists over longer periods. A final 
limitation of this study is that the analyses concerning 
the interaction of neuroticism and self-rated health 
were exploratory, as we found a significant interaction 
effect only in the case of mortality from cancer. The 
lack of significant interaction effects is probably attrib-
utable to a combination of our very conservative crite-
rion for significance and the fact that the power to 
detect interaction effects is considerably lower than that 
to detect main effects (McClelland & Judd, 1993). 
Researchers should thus repeat our analyses in other 
data sets, and use an alpha criterion that better balances 
power to detect interaction effects and avoidance of a 
high Type I error rate.
The findings of this study raise the question of why 
neuroticism becomes protective against mortality from 
all causes and cancer in people with fair or poor self-
rated health. These protective effects were not explained 
by the health behaviors we assessed (smoking, exercise, 
fruit and vegetable intake and alcohol consumption) 
and did not vary according to the presence of diag-
nosed disease. It may be that individuals with higher 
neuroticism are more vigilant about their health if they 
perceive it to be less than excellent. They may be more 
aware of bodily, including autonomic, symptoms and 
may be more likely to consult their doctor, perhaps 
thereby increasing the likelihood of earlier diagnosis 
and prompt treatment. As we noted earlier, our findings 
regarding the Neuroticism facets provide some evi-
dence in support of this idea: The lower risk of all-
cause mortality seen in individuals with high scores on 
the worried-vulnerable facet could have been due to a 
greater propensity to seek medical advice. Future analy-
sis of primary-care records for this cohort—not cur-
rently available—could lend further support to this 
explanation. If prompt seeking of medical advice is 
indeed a mechanism underlying the covert protective 
effect of neuroticism, researchers may need to reevalu-
ate the evidence regarding the economic costs of neu-
roticism in terms of use of health-care resources 
(Cuijpers et al., 2010).
The present results suggest that perhaps the most 
promising avenue for future research would be a closer 
examination of the role of Neuroticism’s facets, for 
example, the six—anxiety, angry-hostility, depression, 
self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability—
operationalized by the Revised NEO Personality 
Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). A study of the asso-
ciation between “nuances” (Mõttus, Kandler, Bleidorn, 
Riemann, & McCrae, 2017) of neuroticism (e.g., the 48 
items from the Revised NEO Personality Inventory Neu-
roticism scale) no doubt will also yield insights into 
when and why neuroticism might harm or protect 
health.
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